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NOTE
AN ABSENCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
THE MY LAI MASSACRE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The legacy of My Lai leaves behind many unanswered questions concerning accountability. For instance: Why in the aftermath
of the massacre was there a failure to charge all those soldiers and
high-ranking officials responsible for the carnage? Why was there a
failure to convict those charged? Why were the sentences of the
convicted not sustained? This article will discuss the breaking of
the silence surrounding the massacre, the formal investigation led
by Lieutenant General William R. Peers, the actual events that
have become known as the "My Lai Massacre," the disposition of
charges, the convictions, the apparent lack of United States
accountability, the United States cover-up, as well as the United
States government's disregard for the Nuremberg Principles.
II.

THE BEGINNING

In the fall of 1969, war-weary America received a shock from
the distant land of Vietnam.' On November 13, newspapers across
the country printed accounts of a gruesome massacre that occurred
eighteen months earlier in the Vietnamese hamlet of My Lai by the
United States infantry unit known as "Charlie Company." The
Charlie Company was a unit of the American Division's 11th Infantry Brigade. At the time of the massacre, the unit had been in Vietnam for just over three months.2 The men of Charlie Company
were young Americans with an average age of about twenty.3 An
official U.S. Army report referred to the Charlie Company as "A
1. Steven Manning, The My Lai Massacre,THE ScHoLASTic

UPDATE,

April 6, 1990, at

12.
2. MiCHEAL BILTON &
3. Id.

KEviN

SIM,

FoUR

HouRs

iN My LAi 3 (Viking

Books, 1992).
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typical cross section of American youth assigned to most combat
'4
units."
The spring of 1998 marked the thirtieth anniversary of what
has become known as the My Lai massacre, an event that disillusioned most Americans.5 Across the nation, Americans read the
newspapers and watched news programs in horror as the story
unfolded of a 41/2 hour assault on the unresisting and unarmed civilian population by United States soldiers. This attack led to the
deaths of over 500 Vietnamese men and women, young and old.
The graphic pictures of mutilated babies and corpses piled en
masse, reminiscent of Nazi brutality, appeared to Americans to be
an aberration.' How could the United States government, the great
peacekeepers, behave like Nazis? The events at My Lai, unfortunately, lent credence to the allegation that the United States was
committing war crimes in Vietnam.7
Perhaps even more disillusioning than the massacre was the
United States government's delayed response to these acts as well
as their subsequent failure to convict all those accountable, and to
sustain the convictions of the guilty. For many Americans, the failure to convict and to sustain the convictions of the guilty was an
admission by the United States government that it was condoning
the behavior of those involved in the slaughter. Such apathy further soiled the military's reputation and fueled opposition to an
already unpopular war. In order to attempt to understand what
really happened at My Lai, it is worthwhile to trace the history of
the breaking of the wall of silence that surrounded the massacre.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Ronald Ridenhour, Perspective on My Lai: It was a Nazi Kind of Thing, America Still
Has Not Come to Terms with the Implications of this Slaughter of Unarmed and Unresisting
CiviliansDuringthe Wetnam War, THE Los ANGELES TiMEs, March 16, 1993, at B7. Shortly
after 7 a.m. on March 16, 1968, the first platoon of Charlie Company landed just outside of a
small village in central Vietnam and within hours had massacred an entire community of
unarmed and unresisting civilians.
6. See LIEUTENANT GENERAL W.R. PEERS, THE My LAI INQuiRY 18 (W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc. 1979). A December 5, 1969, issue of Life magazine had a well-documented
article of the My Lai incident. It included some color photographs taken during the My Lai
operation by former Army photographer, Ronald L. Haeberle. The photographs were
graphic and bloody, with several scenes of dead women and children. The Life article helped
to focus the attention of many Americans on the events of My Lai and on the subsequent
criminal trials.
7. Matthew Lippman, War Crimes: The My Lai Massacre and the Vietnam War, 1 SAN
DIEGO JusnCE J. 295 (1993).
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A.

Broken Silence

Toward the end of March, 1969, 11th Brigade GI, Ronald
Ridenhour, then 22 years old, and just home from Vietnam, had
spent months wondering what he should do with his knowledge of a
dark and bloody event that had occurred a year earlier in a South
Vietnamese village.8
Ridenhour had been a paratrooper in the 11th Infantry Brigade, which was disbanded at the end of November 1967, a week
before the 11th Brigade went to Vietnam. 9 Ridenhour had been
reassigned to the brigade's aviation section as a door gunner, while
some of the other soldiers from the 11th Infantry had been reassigned to the Charlie Company, 1/20th Infantry.'0 It was from these
fellow brigade members from Charlie Company that Ridenhour
learned of the mass killings at the Vietnamese hamlet called
"Pinkville."
Ridenhour recalled the initial conversation that he
had with his friend Gruver in early spring 1968, in which Gruver
revealed the story of My Lai. 2 The Charlie Company member
explained, "We went in there and killed everybody ...We shot 'em

up and shot 'em down. Three hundred, four hundred - I don't know
how many.' 1 3 For several months after that initial conversation,
Ridenhour searched for the truth of what really happened at My
Lai. He spoke to several enlisted men, each corroborating the prior
depiction of mass killings and sheer brutality.
When Ridenhour spoke with Charlie Company enlistee,
Michael Terry, Terry admitted that he, along with Billy Doherty,
had taken part in the killings.14 He explained, "Billy and I started

to get out our chow, but close to us were a bunch of Vietnamese in
a heap and some were moaning. Calley's platoon had been through
before us, and all of them had been shot. But many weren't dead.
It was obvious that they weren't going to get any medical attention,
so Billy and I got up and went over to where they were. I guess we
8. BILTON & SIM, supra note 2, at 214.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 215.
11. Ridenhour, supra note 5, at B7. Task Force Barker's GIs knew the South Vietnam
hamlet as "Pinkville," both for its color on military maps and for its reputation as the home
base for a fierce Viet Cong battalion.
12. BILTON & Smi, supra note 2, at 215.

13. It at 214.
14. 1I at 216.
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sort of finished them off."15 Sergeant Larry La Croix told
Ridenhour, "It was terrible. They were slaughtering villagers like
so many sheep." 16 La Croix explained that when a machine gunner
ceased fire, Lieutenant William Calley took over the M-60 and finished off17 the first group, and then continued to fire at random
civilians.

Haunted by these stories, Ridenhour decided to break the year
long wall of silence that surrounded the events at "Pinkville" and
on April 2, 1969 posted a letter to Mo Udall and thirty other prominent men in Washington, DC, revealing all of the information he
collected about the tragedy.' 8

B.

The United States Government's Response

Ronald Ridenhour's letter provoked an instant reaction, beginning with Mo Udall's office circulating the letter to members of the
House Armed Services Committee, with Udall personally pressuring the committee chairman, Mendell Rivers, to request an investigation. 19 Copies of the letter were also passed through the
congressional liaison section of the Army, forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Earle "Bus" Wheeler, and to the
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 219. Mo Udall was Ridenhour's local Democratic Congressman whose anti-war
views received wide publicity in conservative Arizona. The letter was also sent to President
Nixon, the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Edward Kennedy, Barry Goldwater, Eugene McCarthy, and William Fulbright. Ridenhour
sent the letters registered mail, thinking that staff opening them would be bound to take the
contents more seriously. It read:

Gentlemen:
It was in late April 1968 that I first heard of "Pinkville" and what allegedly

happened there. I received that first report with some skepticism but in the
following months I was to hear similar stories from such a wide variety of people
that it became impossible for me to disbelieve that something rather dark and
bloody did indeed occur sometime in March 1968 in a village called "Pinkville" in
the Republic of Vietnam. . .Exactly what did in fact occur in the village of
"Pinkville" in March 1968 1 do not know for certain, but I am convinced that it was
something very black indeed. I remain irrevocably persuaded that I do truly believe
in the principles of justice and the equality of every man, however humble, before
the law, that form the very backbone that this country is founded on. Then we must
press forward a widespread and public investigation of this matter with all our
combined efforts. Id. at 219.
19. BILTON & sIM, supra note 2, at 221.
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office of the Army Chief of Staff.2" Subsequently, an urgent preliminary inquiry was ordered br the Office of the Inspector General.21
Soon thereafter, Colonel Howard Whitaker, Deputy Inspector
General at Long Binh, Saigon, and head of the preliminary investigation, signaled Washington that a further inquiry was necessary.22
In Washington, Colonel William Wilson was ordered to head the
investigation. The evidence that Wilson accrued through interviews

with the members of Charlie Company, convinced him that a criminal investigation would have to follow.3
Finally on November 24, 1969, nearly seven months after
Ridenhour drafted his letter and twenty months after the massacre,
an official criminal investigation into the events at Pinkville was

ordered.24 The Army Chief of Staff named Lieutenant General
William R. Peers to head the formal investigation.' The formal
criminal investigation was to become known as the "Peers Inquiry."
The Peers Inquiry ascertained much of its information through

the testimonies of key witnesses such as Colonel Henderson,
Officer Thompson, Captain Medina and other division higher echelon testimony, military documentation on "Charlie Company," as
well as survivor interviews and cite trips.26 It was through the
20. Id.
21. ld.
at 221. Colonel Howard Whitaker, deputy Inspector General at the headquarters
of the Office of the Inspector General at Long Binh, received his orders to investigate the
allegations on April 12, 1969. Id. at 221.
22. Id. at 223. Colonel William Wilson was assigned to investigate the incident from the
IG headquarters in Washington, DC. Wilson conducted interviews with all of the men
named in Ridenhour's letter. Wilson later recalled, "If the Pinkville incident was true, it was
coldblooded murder. I hoped to God it was false, but if it wasn't I wanted the bastards
exposed for what they'd done." Id. at 223.
23. Id. at 231.
24. PEERS, supra note 6, at 3.
25. Ia-Lt. Peers received instructions from General William C. Westmoreland, the Army
Chief of Staff on November 24,1969. Peers commented, "(Westmoreland) wanted me to find
out what had gone wrong with the reporting system; why in his position as commander of
U.S. forces in Vietnam at the time, he had not been fully informed; and whether the
operation had been investigated." Id.
26. Id. at 52, 66, 77, 85. Colonel Oran K. Henderson was the commanding officer of the
11th Infantry Brigade at the time of the My Lai incident. Warrant Officer Hugh C.
Thompson, had been assigned to B Company, an Aero Scout unit of the 123rd Aviation
Battalion, "the Warlords." On the morning of March 16, 1968, Thompson was the pilot of
the observation helicopter, that was part of a three helicopter team, whose mission was to fly
over and around the My Lai battle area, in order to relay information to the ground forces.
Captain Ernest L. Medina, was Charlie Company's commander officer during the My Lai
operation. Other key witnesses questioned included: Lt. Colonel Richard K. Blackledge, the
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efforts of Lieutenant William Peers and his investigative team, that

Americans learned of what really happened at My Lai.2 7
III.

THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND WHAT REALLY
HAPPENED AT My LAI

The thorough Peers Inquiry investigation revealed that in
March 1968, the United States objective was to engage and destroy
the 48th Battalion of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), which
was reportedly headquartered in the Son My Village.2 8 Previous
efforts to pacify the area proved unsuccessful. The frustrated
United States military determined that they would decimate the
province, declaring it a "free fire zone."'29 A "free fire zone" declaration empowered the United States military to freely attack all
targets and suspected targets, without prior approval. ° The Son
intelligence officer with the 11th Infantry Brigade at the time of the My Lai incident; Major
Robert W. McKnight, operations officer of the 11th Infantry Brigade; Major Charles C.
Calhoun, Task Force operations officer and executive officer; Major Eugene M. Kotuoc, Task
Force Barker's intelligence officer; Captain Charles R. Lwellen, assistant operations officer
for Task Force Barker who tape recorded the My Lai operation on the Task Force command
radio net; Master Sergeant William J.Johnson, operations sergeant for Task Force Barker,
who was responsible for handling all the reports coming in from Lt. Colonel Barker's
command helicopter and three rifle companies, as well as maintaining the operations log;
Captain Dennis R. Vasquez, Task Force artillery liaison officer; Captain Steven J. Gamble,
the commander of the artillery battery that supported Task Force Barker; Captain William C.
Riggs, commander of the Alpha Company at the time of the incident; Major Frederic W.
Watke, commander of Company B (Aero Scout Company), 123rd Aviation Battalion; First
Lt. Dennis Johnson, of the 52nd Military Intelligence Detachment; Sergeant Doung Minh, an
interpreter who had accompanied Charlie Co. in its My Lai combat assault; Specialist-5, Jay
Roberts, staff writer; Sergeant Ronald L. Haberle, photographer; Lt. Colonel Edwin D.
Beers, commander of the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry. Id. at 52, 66, 77, 85.
27. Id. at 12. The Inquiry panel initially consisted of: Lt. William R. Peers, Bland West,
assistant general counsel of the Army; Colonel G.W. Everett of the Secretary of the
General's Staff's office; Colonel William Wilson, who head the IG investigation, Colonel
Robert Miller, chief of the international division of the Judge Advocate general's office;
Major E. F. Zychowski, an experienced investigator with the Office of the Provost Marshal
General, Lt. Colonel James H. Breen, who was with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations; Major Clyde D. Lynn, who served as recorder; Lt. Colonel Dan Zink, with
the Office of the Chief of Information; Robert MacCrate, senior partner in the NY law firm
of Sullivan & Cromwell; Jerome Walsh, a young partner in the NY firm, Walsh & Frisch;
Colonel Joseph R. (Ross) Franklin, who was with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations; Colonel Thomas F. Whalen, Lt. Colonel James H. Patterson and Major Joseph I.
Apici. By the time the Inquiry was completed in March 1970, the overall panel and staff had
reached a total of ninety-two. Id.at 12.
28. Lippman, supra note 7, at 308.
29. i&
30. I&
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My subhamlet of My Lai was one of many provinces classified as a
"free fire zone." The classification was a direct response to military
intelligence reports which claimed that the civilian population was
actively sympathetic to the Viet Cong. 1 On March 15, Captain
Kotuoc, the task force intelligence officer, briefed the commanders
and staff, stating that by 7:00 a.m., all inhabitants of the village
would have departed for the markets in the area of Quang Ngai
City. The Commanders were also instructed that Charlie Company
would receive strong enemy resistance since the 48th Battalion of
the North Vietnamese Army had its headquarters in My Lai. 2
In addition to the strong belief held by intelligence and operations officers that Charlie Company would encounter strong enemy
resistance, Peers Inquiry testimony revealed that there was some
confusion regarding the scheme of maneuver and instructions
regarding the burning of dwellings, destroying crops and livestock
and the handling of the civilians.33 Contrasting testimonies were
extracted from Charlie Company officers, Captain Calhoun and
Captain Medina, with respect to the operating procedure at My Lai.
Medina testified that Lieutenant Colonel Barker issued exact
instructions regarding total annihilation, while Calhoun recalled no
such instructions.3 4
Notwithstanding the confusion, the operation commenced at
7:25 a.m. on March 16, with a three-to-five minute artillery barrage
followed by the insertion of troops, supported by suppressive gunfire by helicopter.3 Despite the intelligence reports to the contrary, Charlie Company did not receive any incoming fire as they
scrambled out of their helicopters and initiated a direct combat
assault.3 6
31. Id.
32. PEERS, supra note 6, at 167.
33. ld.
at 167. Peers stated that there were some questions concerning instructions given
by the commanding officers to bum the village's dwellings, kill livestock, and destroy crops
and foodstuffs. In his testimony, Calhoun recalled no such instructions, whereas Kutouc
remembered them vividly. Captain Medina testified that he had received specific orders
from Barker to destroy My Lai. Peers states, "Apparently no instructions were given as to

the handling of civilians." Id. at 167.
34. Ld.Testimonies before the Peers Inquiry revealed that Charlie Company had no
written Standard Operating Procedure regarding the treatment of civilians, dwellings, and
foodstuffs. At best the "free fire zone" declaration was an informal understanding. Id.
35. Lippman, supra note 7, at 303.
36. Id. "The third platoon, along with Medina's command group formed a defensive
perimeter.. .( around the village, while)... the first and second platoons aggressively moved
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The American soldiers reportedly fired at anything that
moved. 7 Bunkers and huts were razed with grenades or raked with
machine gunfire.3" Women, young and old, were raped.39 Some
Vietnamese were shot as they stumbled out of their huts; most were
executed in large assembled groups. 40 Dennis Conti, a mine
sweeper operator who was a participant and an eyewitness to the
massacre, recalled that women and children were pushed into
bunkers, and grenades were thrown in after them.41 At one point
when Conti was alone, he forced a twenty-year-old Vietnamese
woman with a four year old child to perform oral sex upon him,
while he held a gun at the child's head, threatening to kill the
child.4 2 In the end, over 567 Vietnamese civilian men, women and

children were dead.43
IV. THE
A.

TRIAL AND THE AFrERmATH

Disposition of Charges

Although twenty-five participants, both soldiers and officials,
were charged with committing war crimes and related acts, only
four soldiers were brought to trial and only one, First Lieutenant
William Calley, was given a life sentence. However, Calley served
only a few months of that sentence before being paroled. 4
Charges were prepared against twelve officers and soldiers for
military-type offenses, such as the failure to obey lawful orders and
the dereliction of duty by helping to cover-up. Of those twelve
into... My Lai... and almost immediately began to engage in random acts of violence
against the civilians." Id.
37. IL at 305.
38. ld.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Ld.
at 307.
IL at 305.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 305.
Manning, supra note 1, at 12.

44. Kevin Byrne, One Day in a War:My Lai and the HorrorsWe Need to Remember, THE

CHICAGO TRIBUNE, November 13, 1989, at 15. The Secretary of the Army reduced
CaIley's life sentence to 10 years, and in 1975 he was released on parole.

45. PEERS, supra note 6, at 221. As a result of the Peers Inquiry, charges were prepared
against twelve officers suspected of military-type offenses. Military-type offenses included
the failure to obey lawful orders and the dereliction of duty by helping to cover-up the
incident. Those charged included: Major General Samuel W. Koster, charges dismissed
January 29, 1971; Brigadier General George H. Young, charges dismissed June 30, 1970;

Colonel Oran K. Henderson, acquitted on December 17, 1971; Colonel Nels A. Parson,
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officers, the charges against eleven were dismissed, while Colonel
Oran K. Henderson was tried by general court martial.4 6 Henderson's acquittal was handed down on December 17, 1971. 47

In addition to the twelve officers and soldiers charged with military-type offenses, thirteen officers and soldiers were charged with
committing war crimes.4 8 Those war crimes included: premeditated
murder, rape and assault with intent to murder.4 9 Of those officers

and enlisted men charged with committing war crimes, the charges
against seven were dismissed, three were found not guilty, two were
barred from reenlistment and only one, First Lieutenant William
Calley, was found guilty.5"
B. Absence of Accountability
The restricted manner of the criminal investigations and the
almost unanimous dismissals of charges provoked negative public
reaction.5 ' Many of the dismissals were issued from the commandcharges dismissed June 23, 1970; Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Luper, charges dismissed July
28, 1970; Major Charles C. Calhoun, charges dismissed January 6, 1971; Major David C.
Galvin, charges dismissed January 6, 1971; Major William D. Guinn, charges dismissed
January 6, 1971; Major Robert W. McKnight, charges dismissed June 23, 1970; Major
Frederic W. Watke, charges dismissed January 6, 1971; 1st Lieutenant Kenneth W. Boatman,
charges dismissed July 28, 1970; 1st Lieutenant Dennis H. Johnson, charges dismissed
February 26, 1971. PEERS, supra note 6, at 221.
46. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 822, 823. A court martial may consist of six or more members, 10
U.S.C. § 816, and may be convened by the President, secretaries of military departments, or
by senior commanding officers. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 858, 858a. A court martial may impose
sentences of confinement and/or discharge.
47. PEERS, supra note 6, at 221.
48. IL at 221. Those charged with War Crimes: Officers- Captain Eugene M. Kotouc,
charged with premeditated murder, court martial, not guilty ; 1st Lieutenant Thomas K.
Willingham, charged with premeditated murder, charges dismissed; 1st Lieutenant William L.
Calley, Jr., charged with murder, court martial, life imprisonment, paroled; Captain Ernest L.
Medina, charged with murder, court martial, not guilty; Enlisted Men- Sergeant Kenneth L.
Hodges, charged with rape and assault with intent to murder, discharged; Sergeant Charles
E. Hutton, charged with murder, rape and assault with intent to murder, barred from reenlistment; Sergeant David Mitchell, charged with assault with intent to murder, court
martial, not guilty; Sergeant Esquiel Torres, charged with premeditated murder, discharged;
Specialist-4 William F. Doherty, charged with premeditated murder, barred from reenlistment; Specialist-4 Robert W. T'Souvas, charged with premeditated murder, charges
dismissed; Corporal Kenneth Schiel, charged with premeditated murder, charges dismissed;
Private Max Hutson, charged with premeditated murder, charges dismissed; Private Gerald
A. Smith, charged with premeditated murder, barred from re-enlistment. Id. at 221.
49. Lippman, supra note 7, at 118.
50. PEERS, supra note 6, at 227.
51. See Manning & Byrne, supra text accompanying note 1, at 44.
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ing generals, Seaman and Conner, after their own evaluation and
upon the advice of their Staff Judge Advocates. Lieutenant Peers
commented, "Had (the accused) undergone trial by court martial
and been acquitted, there would have been no remaining doubts.
However, for a single individual to make such decisions seems
inappropriate."'5 2
Lieutenant Peers remarked that he was especially disturbed by
the dismissal of charges against the senior officers, most notably,
General Samuel W. Koster. 3 Peers noted that General Koster's
Article 32 investigation was conducted by Brigadier General B. L.
Evans, an engineer officer who had served in Vietnam, but who had
not been involved in combat operations. 4 General Koster was the
commander of the 23d Infantry (American) division and was
charged with the failure to conduct a prompt and proper investigation into the March 16, 1968 actions at My Lai. 5 Evans' report
justified Koster's actions and stressed the General's fine character
and outstanding military career. 6 As a result of Evans' report, a
letter of censure was issued to General Koster; the Secretary of the
Army reduced his rank to permanent grade of Brigadier General;
and his Distinguished Service Medal was withdrawn. 7 There was
overwhelming evidence that Koster had knowledge of irregularitiei
during the My Lai operation. The information available to Koster
included: 1) a high body count and low weapons count, 2) agent's
reports that several hundreds of civilians had been slaughtered, 3)
Viet Cong communiqu6s and broadcasts, 4) allegations confirmed
by American ground and air forces, and 5) reports of eavesdropped
radio communications about a bloodbath.58 The Peers Inquiry
report noted that "there was at least a tacit decision to withhold
from higher headquarters any information concerning the incident. '59 Furthermore, the Peers Inquiry also reported that
52. PEERS, supra note 6, at 223.
53. Id.

54. Id.
55. Koster v. U.S., 685 F.2d 407, 408 (1982).
56. PEERS, supra note 6, at 223. While Evans' report acknowledged that General Koster

may have been remiss in not reporting the civilian casualties and in not ordering a proper
investigation, it stressed General's Koster's fine character and his long career of outstanding
service and recommended dismissal of all charges. PEERS, supra note 6, at 223.
57. Id. at 221.
58. BiLTON & Sim, supra note 2, at 188.
59. Lippman, supra note 7, at 102.
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although Koster directed Colonel Oran Henderson to examine the
My Lai matter, no effort was made to ensure that an "adequate
investigation would be conducted."6 Despite this evidence, Koster
merely received a censure for his part in the cover-up.6 ' Lieutenant
Peers commented that Koster's dismissal was a travesty of justice
which would establish a precedent that would be difficult for the
Army to justify.6'
C. Public Response to the My Lai Trials
Attorney and Peers Inquiry panel member, Bob MacCrate and
Congressman Samuel S. Stratton were also distressed by the Koster
dismissal. MacCrate, in a New York Times article, stated, "I believe
that the Commanding Officer of The First Army has effectively cut
off the orderly progress of the inquiry up the chain of command in
acting at this time as he has... What is involved is a failure to

recognize the Army's responsibility to the public at large."63 MacCrate felt that Koster's dismissal, and subsequent dismissals, were a
failure by the Army to recognize the importance of acting in
accordance with the law of war. Congressman Stratton joined MacCrate by objecting to the Koster dismissal. On February 4, 1971, he
made a long speech on the floor of the House in which he stated,
"Dropping charges against the highest ranking officer involved,
without any public trial or even discussion of the case against him
. . . can only result in serious damage to the reputation of the

United States Army, to the United States, and to the effectiveness
of the processes and procedures of military justice in dealing with
matters which involve profound national and international concerns." 64 Criticism of the decision proliferated in the mainstream
media. Numerous articles and editorials were published which
expressed a general misunderstanding of the dismissals.65 The sentiments expressed by Lieutenant Peers, Bob MacCrate, Congressman Stratton, and much of the public at large, would forever
60. ld.
61. PEERS, supra note 6, at 223. On January 28, 1971, almost three months to the day after
receiving General Evans' report, General Seaman dismissed the charges and issued General

Koster a letter of censure.
62. Id
63. Id. at 224.
64. Id.

65. Id. at 225.
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immortalize the My Lai prosecutions as a travesty of justice of
mammoth proportions. In the end, of the twenty-five charged with
committing war crimes and/or related acts, First Lieutenant William
Calley was the only participant who was tried and found guilty by
Court Martial.
D. 1st Lieutenant William Calley, a Scapegoat?
Calley's highly publicized trial lasted seventy-seven days and
involved over one-hundred witnesses. 6 Calley became notorious
and his participation in the My Lai massacre became the subject of
conversation across the nation.67 Finally, after months of dismissals
, and an apparent lack of accountability for the massacre, the public
had someone to blame. But Calley was only one of many directly
involved in the arbitrary destruction of an entire village. Was Calley merely a government scapegoat?
William Peers commented that, "I think it most unfortunate
that of the twenty-five men who were charged... (Calley) was the
only one tried by court martial and found guilty. On the other hand
...he was in command of his platoon and was fully aware of what
they were doing.., he was convicted of killing at least twenty-two
civilians, but his platoon may have killed as many as 150 to 200
0 innocent women, children and old men.. .So I don't consider him a
scapegoat." 6 America's divisiveness over Calley's guilt, as evidenced by William Peers statement, permeated the trial and subsequent appeal process, and may have resulted in the eventual
reduction of his sentence.
Calley was convicted on three counts of premeditated murder
and on one count of assault to commit murder. 69 He was sentenced
to dismissal, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement
to hard labor for life.7° The court found that the evidence sug-

66. Lippman, supra note 7, at 140.
67. Manning, Lippman & Byrne, supra note 1, 7, and 44.
68. PEERS, supra note 6, at 227-228.
69. U.S. v. Calley, 1973 WL 14570 (ACMR), 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1138 (1973). Calley was
found to be in violation of Articles 118 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C

§ 918 and § 934.
70. Id-
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gested that Lieutenant Calley initiated much of the murder, acting
both in an individual capacity and as an officer. 7 '
Eyewitness testimony from soldiers in Calley's platoon were
particularly damaging. Enlistee Meadlo testified that he was guarding a group of villagers with enlistee Dennis Conti when Lieutenant
Calley approached him and said, "You know what to do with them,
Meadlo." He assumed that this meant only to continue guarding
them. However, Calley returned several minutes later and said,
"How come they're not dead?" and Meadlo replied, "I didn't know
we were suppose to kill them. ' 72 Lieutenant Calley then directed,
"I want them dead." Meadlo remembered that Calley backed away
and began firing into the group before he did the same.73 Conti
recounted that Calley told him and Meadlo, "To take care of the
people . . . kill them."'74 Specialist Four Sledge corroborated
Meadlo and Conti's testimony when he remembered moving with
Calley to the South side of the village where they found Meadlo
and Conti with a group of thirty to forty Vietnamese. Sledge testified that he heard Calley tell Meadlo "to waste them" and that
when he was walking away he heard gunshots and screaming. He
glanced back and saw a few people fall, but did not see Calley firing. 75 Calley defended himself on the grounds that he was following orders from Captain Medina ".

.

. to waste the Vietnamese

people and to get my people out in line, out in the position where
they were supposed to be."' 76 The court held that there was no
doubt that the defenseless Vietnamese were shot summary execution style by either Meadlo and Calley or by Meadlo, at the order of
Calley. Foundation evidence was provided by the photographs
taken by former Specialist Four Ronald Haeberle near the south
side of the village. The court held that,

"...foundation

evidence

satisfactorily authenticates the photograph as being of the same
group of bodies as was the subject of... the testimonies of Meadlo,

71. Major Jeffrey Addicott & Major William Hudson, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of
My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 MiL L. Rv. 153, 170 (1993).
72. See U.S. supra note 69, at 1169.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1169.
Id.
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Conti and Sledge. ' 77 Testimonies elicited from other witnesses
recalled similar incidents of mass murder by Calley and others.78
Specialist Four Hall testified that he remembered collecting
thirty or forty people, putting them into a ditch and then proceeding to a position farther away. He noticed that Calley and several
others stayed behind, and then he heard fully automatic fire behind
him coming from the area in the ditch. Hall later crossed the ditch
and recalled, "They were dead. There was blood coming from them
...They were very old people, very young children, and mothers
...
There was blood all over them. '79 The observations of the eyewitnesses in the supporting helicopters portrayed an equally ghastly
overview of the massacre in the ditch. Aviator, Lieutenant Thompson, who succeeded in evacuating a few living Vietnamese, recalled
Lieutenant Calley boasting to him, "I'm the boss here."8
After the court considered all of the factors involved, including
the mitigating circumstances such as the nature of the Vietnam war
itself, the unknown enemy, and the physical surroundings, they
unanimously found Calley guilty of the crimes charged. The three
judge panel held, "[d]estructive as war is, war is not an occasion for
the unrestrained satisfaction of an individual soldier's proclivity to
kill."81 The court reasoned that the approved sentence, twenty
years of hard labor, was not too severe a consequence of Calley
choosing to commit mass murder.82
After the sentence was handed down, the public outcry supporting Calley intensified.83 Many from politicians to soldiers to
lawyers to American housewives, felt that Calley had become a
government lamb that was sent to a very public slaughter.' In
response to the verdict, a five-man draft board in Athens, Georgia
resigned, and chairman George Pugh said, "Our conscience will not
allow us to continue when our men are treated like that. I take the
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1170. Additional testimony was elicited from enlistees Hall, Olsen, Grzesik,

Dursi and Trner.
79. Id.

80. Id. at 1172.
81. See U.S. supra note 69, at 1196.
82. Id.
83. ARTHUR EvERE-r, KATHERUNE JOHNSON & HARRY ROSENTHAL, CALLEY 269
(Sidney Moody et al. eds., 1971).
84. Id.
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position that war is war." 5 Senator Herman A. Talmadge was
"saddened to think that one could fight for his flag and then be
court-martialed for apparently carrying out his orders. '8 6 Defense
attorney William Kunstler said, "The real perpetrators of the crime
pace the Oval Room of the White House. If the Nuremberg Principle means anything, who does it apply to-the Nazis and not the Nixons?"8 7 Citizens everywhere spoke out, sending telegrams to Ft.
Benning where Calley was being held, and to the Judge, to the
jurors, to the President, protesting the verdict and claiming injustice. 8 Even Ronald Ridenhour, the soldier who wrote the initial
letter and broke the wall of silence, felt that too much emphasis was
placed on Calley and that,

"...a

strong case can be made against

the chain of command." 89

E. Executive Intervention
In response to this overwhelming public outcry, President
Nixon decided to personally review Calley's case before the sentence was finally put into operation at any level. John Ehrlichman,
assistant to the President on domestic affairs, in a press conference,
discussed Nixon's response. Ehrlichman explained, "[t]he Code of
Military Justice does not provide for an appeal to the President of
the United States, not for any mandatory review by the President of
the United States in a case of this kind ...the President is saying

before the sentence is finally put into operation at any level, he will
personally review the case and make a final decision in the case." 90
However, pursuant to Article II section 2 of the Constitution of the
United States, "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army... and he shall have the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States . . . "91 Thus, acting

within his power as Commander-in-Chief to voluntarily grant
reprieves and pardons, Nixon ordered Calley out of the stockade
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id at 272.
Id. at 273.
Id at 279.
Id at 273.
Id. at 275.
Id at 289.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, section 2.
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and put under house arrest at his apartment at Ft. Benning, while
all of the appeals were being heard. 2
In the end, Caley only served three years under house arrest
for his participation in the deaths of noncombatant Vietnamese
men, women and children. For many Americans and the world at
large, Calley's three-year sentence was three years too long, for
others the sentence was far too short.
V. THE MLiTARY COVER-UP
The failure to convict all those platoon soldiers and/or highranking military officials responsible for the bloodshed and Calley's
subsequent scapegoat status may be directly attributed to the coverup perpetrated by the higher military eschelon involved in the massacre.93 The facts of the massacre remained hidden for too long. In
every command level from company to division, actions were taken
either to conceal or omit the truth of the carnage from the appropriate authorities. 94 The concealment or omissions ranged from the
deliberate or negligent failure to report acts of murder and war
crimes, false reports of combatant and noncombatant casualties,
orders to suppress or conceal the incident issued directly from military superiors, as well as an apparent complacent attitude toward
the My Lai prosecutions held by the Nixon Administration. 95
A. Failure to report acts of murder and war crimes
The Peers commission report established that members of
Charlie Company, First Battalion, 20th Infantry, did not report the
crimes perpetrated by that unit on March 16, 1968. 96 It can be
argued that the collective nature of the failure to report resulted
from the fact that many of the members were directly implicated in
the massacre. In order to avert their own demise, members avoided
reporting or even talking about the tragedy. The Peers report comments on the deficiency by explaining that the collective reluctance
to expose"

. . .

was facilitated by the nature of the operation which

92. EvRErr, supra note 83, at 280.
93. JOSEPH GoLnsmr, BuR.E MARSHALL & JACK ScHwARTZ, My LAx MASSACRE AND
rrs COVER-up: BEYOND THE REACH OF LAW? 299 (The Free Press 1976).

94. Id.
95. PEERS, supra note 6, at 253.

96. Id. at 300.
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isolated (Charlie Company) ...by the fact that the company was
detached from its parent battalion at the time of the operation and
remained so for some weeks thereafter, and by the fact that Son My
village was located in a VC-controlled area. ' 97 In addition to the
failure to fully report, the Peers Inquiry determined that when Captain Medina did observe and report noncombatant casualties, the
number reported was far less than the actual death count.98
B. False reports of non-combatant and combatantfatalities
The Peers Inquiry noted that it was clear from the testimonies
given by Charlie Company members who were involved in the
March 16 operation, that there was a far greater number of noncombatant casualties than the 20-28 reported and a far greater
number of combatant casualties than the 38 reported by Captain
Medina. 99 The Peers Inquiry concluded that false reports were
issued by commanding officers in response to information
requests. 100
Many of the reports reported noncombatant casualties as combatant casualties, arguably an effort by the commanding officers to
conceal the atrocities. The Peers report revealed that " . . . at a

minimum, such reports included women and children killed ...
there is evidence that First Lieutenant (now Captain) Willingham
was aware that the majority (if not all) the persons reported as VC
were women and children."10
' Furthermore, the Peers Inquiry discovered that on the eve of the massacre, Captain Michles, in a
response for information concerning the number of casualties that
were women and children, submitted a false report to Task Force
Barker, the parent battalion, claiming that negative women and
children were killed. Testimony from overflight eyewitnesses contradicted the submitted reports. These eyewitnesses testified that at
an altitude of less than 1,000 feet, they were able to observe a large
number of noncombatant casualties. Colonel Henderson testified
that he observed 6-8 such bodies on March 16, while others in his
aircraft admitted to seeing at least 15-20 such bodies.' 2
97. Id.
98. GoLDSTrnN, supra note 93, at 301.

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
PEnRS, supra note 6, at 301.
Id. at 302.
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The Peers Inquiry further noted that one of the most obvious
efforts to suppress information was the false report concerning the
68 VC purportedly killed by artillery. °3 Reportedly, Lieutenant
Barker received a radio message, while flying over My Lai, that
Charlie Company's VC casualties had reached 84. When Barker
returned to LZ Dottie, he met with Colonel Henderson, Lieutenant
Luper, Major McKnight, and Major Calhoun. After that meeting,
an entry was made in the Task Force Barker Journal stating that as
of 8:40 a.m., 69 VC were killed in action at My Lai (4).1° 4 No fur-

ther reports were made after 8:40 a.m. concerning casualties of any
type. According to the Peers Inquiry,

"...

recording and reporting

of VC dead reported by Charlie Company was halted by Task Force
Barker... in response to the order from Colonel Henderson... to
avoid attracting undue attention to Charlie Company's operations
at My Lai."'1 5
C. Orders to suppress and/or conceal the incident issued by
military superiors
Upon the Charlie Company's return to LZ Dottie on March
18, the soldiers were advised by Captain Medina not to discuss the
events that took place at My Lai on March 16.106 The Captain
instructed the men that an investigation into the incident was
underway and that they were not to discuss the events except in the
course of the investigation." ° The company members were thus
lead to believe that they were relieved of their duty to report the
incident. It is conceivable that the many soldiers who withheld
information surrounding My Lai were able to justify their silence by
citing the apparent sanction given to the entire operation by company officers.
D. The Nixon Administration's Complacency
In addition to the blatant suppression of information concerning the bloodshed by military personnel, many Americans viewed
the Nixon Administration's apparent lack of involvement in the
103. Id. at 303.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 302.
106. PEERS, supra note 6, at 300.

107. lId at 301.
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inquiry and subsequent prosecutions as a further effort to disregard
the massacre. 08 William Peers noted that the President could have
taken the opportunity to remind Americans and the world at large
of the nation's obligation to punish those who commit war
crimes.' 0 9 Such Presidential initiative, according to Peers,
"... might have changed the atmosphere in which the subsequent

court martial's were held. But it was not forthcoming." 110
Arguably, the failure of the military justice system to fully
prosecute the crimes committed at My Lai and the absence of Presidential directive were directly attributed to the political environment of the times. The My Lai prosecutions and its discovery of the
United States atrocities increased American and international antiwar and anti-government sentiment 1 William Peers commented
that during the investigations, "Street marches, demonstrations...
were in full swing... the Nixon Administration was trying to find
ways to disengage from South Vietnam.""' 2 In view of the turmoil,
the Administration did not want to take any action that would fuel
the flames of protest or alienate any of their supporters. The prosecutions were simply unwelcome publicity to an already unpopular
war. Accordingly, the Nixon Administration said little and allowed
the prosecutions to proceed. As Commander in Chief, Nixon was
certainly entitled to review the prosecutions." 3 Such a review
would have either appeased those misguided people who either
viewed Calley as an innocent scapegoat or opposed the entire idea
of war crimes. It was not until Calley's conviction that the President
finally spoke out. Many disgruntled citizens viewed the Administration's delayed response as a failure to remind the American people of their country's obligations to punish those who commit war
crimes.'1 4

Nearly thirty years after the massacre, Americans and the
world at large still do not fully know what transpired in that unfor108. Id at 253. "The American people were still in the throes of the anti-Vietnam War
turmoil... The Nixon Administration was trying to find ways to disengage from South
Vietnam and still leave a government and military establishment there capable of providing

its own self-defense." Id. at 253.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 254.
111. Id at 253.
112. Id.
113. See U.S. CONST. art. II, section 2.
114. PEERS, supra note 6, at 254.
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tunate Vietnamese hamlet on March 16, 1968. Efforts to withhold
information continue to this day. The Peers Inquiry noted that six
officers who occupied key positions during the My Lai operation
exercised their right to remain silent. Their testimonies were never
heard and their knowledge is forever retained. Even more disturbing was the Inquiry's finding that even a larger number of witnesses either withheld valuable information or gave false
testimony."15 Despite the obstacles to uncovering the facts, it seems
clear that (in the words of Ronald Ridenhour) something rather
dark and bloody did indeed occur sometime in March 1968 in a
village called Pinkville." 6
VI.

THE UNITED STATES DISREGARD FOR THE LAWS OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL

It can be argued that the lack of accountability for the My Lai
massacre was a tacit acceptance by our government of violations of
the laws of war, as set forth in the Nuremberg Principles. If such
blatant violations of the laws of war, as evidenced by My Lai, are
accepted, the integrity of our society is called into question." 7 At
what point does the massacre of innocent civilians cease being
merely casualties of war and rise to the level of war crimes?"' The
Nuremberg Principles were designed to answer that question and to
end the destruction of civilian populations during war. 119 The Principles were sponsored in the belief that we as a rational, intelligent,
humane people can rise above the mistakes of the past. 2 0 Sadly,
the events at My Lai, twenty three years after the Nuremberg Tri115. GoLDSTEN, supra note 93, at 299.
116. BiLTON & Siv, supra note 2, at 219. Ronald Ridenhour's letter broke the wall of
silence surrounding the massacre.
117. WAR CRMAs

AND

=

AMEmIcAN CONSCIENCE, xiii (Erwin Knoll et al. eds.,

Congressional Forum 1970).
118. Id. at 183. As defined by Nuremberg Principle VI(b), "war crimes" are violations of

the laws or customs of war which include... murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slavelabor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or illtreatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified
by military necessity. See id. at 183.
119. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (August 8,
1945).
120. I&
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bunal sat, proved that we cannot always rise above the mistakes of
the past.
The tacit acceptance of violations of laws of war 121 by the
United States government in the aftermath of My Lai can be
viewed as a blatant disregard of the Nuremberg Principles. The
basic tenets of Nuremberg Principles involve the international use
of the rule of law to punish crimes against peace, crime against
humanity, and war crimes.2 2 According to the Nuremberg Charter, aggressive war was a crime." m
In 1945, the United States, France, The United Kingdom, and
the Soviet Union affirmed unanimously "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal." 24 The Nuremberg definitions consisted of seven principles
which defined as punishable crimes under international law, crimes
against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity."z
A. Requirement of Accountability for Professional Conduct on
the Battlefield
The most popularly understood aspect of the Nuremberg Principles is the requirement for and accountability for professional
conduct on the battlefield. 26 During this century, the United
States disciplined soldiers for battlefield misconduct in the Philippine Insurrection, World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam. 27 However, it was the Vietnam war that divided the country
around politics and the manner in which the war was fought. A
major perception of the Vietnam war was "war is war." Vietnam
was a brutal war described by one theorist as "primitive savagery
augmented by modern technology."' 28 War criminality was commonplace and tactics of terror had become an essential tactic of
war. Proponents of the "war is war" school of thought argue that
121. Id.
122. William Eckhardt, Nuremberg- Fifty Years: Accountability and Responsibility, 65

UNLV L. R-v. 1, 2 (1996).
123. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (Art. VI)
(August 8, 1945).
124. KNOLL ET A.. eds., supra note 117, at 182.
125. Id. at 183. Principle VI of the Nuremberg principles sets out and defines the

punishable crimes.
126. Eckhardt, supra note 122, at 7.

127. Id. at 7.
128. Id.
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atrocities in Vietnam were less common than those from other
wars, but were better known. 12 9 They explained that Vietnam was a
war viewed nightly on American television which
left an impres130
sion, not a reality, more brutal than other wars.
In the aftermath, opponents of the "war is war" school of
thought desired reparations for the brutality that they witnessed. In
a country so committed to the rule of law, accountability on the
battlefield was expected. The atonement that many Americans
desired would unfortunately not come in the form of discipline of
soldiers for battlefield misconduct.
The My Lai atrocities that were war crimes under definition
seven of the Nuremberg Principles included murder or ill-treatment
of the civilian population, the plunder of public and private property, the wanton destruction of the village and devastation not justified by military necessity. 13 For opponents of the "war is war"
school of thought, the My Lai massacre and its abysmal prosecution
record was a horrific reminder of the Holocaust. In 1944, a German
minister in the Balkans protested to a German commanding general (who ordered the burning of the Greek town of Klissura and
the killing of 223 inhabitants, including fifty who were under ten
years old and 128 women and old men) in these terms, "It is sheer
insanity to shoot babies, children, women and old people."' 32 The
evidence surrounding My Lai suggested that the lives of the inhabitants of Vietnam were held of as little value to the American troops
as Klissura's population was to the Nazis. The Nuremberg Principles were designed to prevent the reoccurrence of such dehumanization. According to Telford Taylor, the leaders in Vietnam were
like the German leaders in World War II in that they lost sight of
elementary truths. Telford Taylor wrote, "There is serious cause for
concern that our leaders have become so immersed in the business
of war that they are blind to the ends for which we went to Vietnam
in the first place, and that our troops will come to be feared and
hated perhaps more than the forces against whom they are sup33
posed to be protecting the people.'
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
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B. Prohibitionof Crimes Against Humanity
The United States in 1945 unanimously affirmed the Nuremberg Principles, thereby effectively signing onto the belief that military personnel should be held personally and criminally responsible
for war crimes. The indiscriminate killing of the Vietnamese at My
Lai and the subsequent lack of accountability for those killings was
a direct violation of Principle VI's prohibition of crimes against
humanity. Crimes against humanity committed at My Lai, which
were done in connection with war crimes, included murder and
inhuman acts done against the civilian population.' These crimes
against humanity reverberated back to Americans and throughout
the world. Many Americans questioned, "How could our boys do
this?" Theorist George Eckhardt commented that, "With My Lai,
the United States lost its virginity. Yes, war crimes could happen to
us. Never before would one have thought that someone must actually teach American soldiers that they are not to kill unarmed,
'
unresisting non-combatants-women, children, and, yes, babies."135
The Nuremberg Principles were, in effect, a collaborative, constitutional break on the use of force. The deterioration of the principles during Vietnam clearly undermined the value of the
precedent worldwide. As Senator Taft, in a controversial speech at
Kenyon College expressed, "[p]eace in the world can only come if a
law is agreed to relating to international relations.' 36 Peace in the
world will not come to fruition if nations, such as the United States,
disregard basic moral and humane parameters and permit officers
and soldiers to engage in a free reign of terror and justify terror in
the name of warfare.
VII.

CONCLUSION

General William Sherman's dictum that "war is hell" dates
back to the civil war.' 37 According to historian Paul Fussell, frontline soldiers in World War II recognized the vast differences
134. Id at 183. Crimes against humanity:

Murder, extermination, enslavement,

deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on

political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried
on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime. Id. at 183.
135. Eckhardt, supra note 122, at 8.
136. KNoLL Er AL., eds., supra note 117, at 1.

137. Bryne, supra note 44, at 15.
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between the official version of the "clean" war and the numbing
reality of the war they fought.' 38 Apologists have pointed to, and
will continue to point to, the pressures upon soldiers during combat.
However, does Sherman's statement justify the United States leniency for soldiers who commit war crimes?
After the Peers Inquiry, a number of changes in the laws relating to the prosecutions of war crimes were suggested in response to
the failure to adequately punish those responsible for the atrocities
committed at My Lai. Peers noted that, "The House Armed Services Committee recommended turning over the cases of persons
outside of military jurisdiction to the federal courts."' 39 Other suggestions included the creation of a civilian tribunal to adjudicate
cases. Another idea was to vest jurisdiction of all war crimes prosecutions in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, with
the Department of Justice being responsible for investigation and
prosecution. 4 ° In the aftermath, there was also an increased interest in the creation of an International Criminal Court. Despite the
heightened interest, the dream of an International Criminal Court
still has not reached fruition, nearly thirty years after the disgrace of
the My Lai prosecutions. The ad hoc international tribunals for
Bosnia and Rwanda, with their recent successes, have the beginnings of what could become a recognized, enforceable and
permanent response to war crime violations.
Those who commit war crimes must be held accountable.
Attempts have been made in the past to sanction accountability for
war crimes by reconciling military needs with the requirements of
justice. Unfortunately, the expression of these reconciliations, as
evidenced by the Nuremberg Principles,' 4 ' which imposed a duty
upon the nations which wage war, has not been effective. The laws
created by that document proved unenforceable in the My Lai trials. Despite the lack of accountability for My Lai, the fact does
remain that the My Lai prosecutors secured one sole conviction,
that of First Lieutenant Calley.
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War may be "hell," as Sherman wrote, but standards can and
must be established which would enable the perpetrators to be
brought to substantial justice.
Jeannine Davanzo

